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The Dominion model of transitional constitutionalism  




This symposium has explored New Dominion constitutionalism inductively and 
contextually, placing the phenomenon within a historically nested set of ideas and 
practices from the Old (Settler) Dominions, through the “Bridge Dominion” of Ireland, 
before giving detailed attention to the South Asian  New Dominions of India, Pakistan, 
and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). The articles collectively form a basis from which to 
analyze the legal configuration of New Dominion status and its legacy by exploring 
links between New Dominion constitutional framing and post-independence design and 
practice. Building on the case studies, the principal contention of this summative 
contribution is that New Dominion constitutionalism should be understood as the first 
constitutional model of note designed to manage political transitions on a global scale. 
A product of the twilight of the British Empire, New Dominion constitutionalism 
represents a model for decolonizing nations and an important antecedent to later post-
Cold War transitions. Both transitional and transnational, New Dominion status 
offered an interim frame of government for political transitions, the fuzzy center of 
which derived from Westminster-style conventions of political constitutionalism, as 




1. Introduction  
 
New Dominion constitutionalism can be reasonably characterized as the first interim 
constitutional model of note designed to manage complex political transitions on a 
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global scale. It refers to the acquisition of responsible government by a handful of non-
settler British colonies through Dominion status, a temporary constitutional 
arrangement that eventually led to their transformation into republics. A product of the 
twilight of the British Empire, New Dominion constitutionalism represents a crucial 
but understudied instrument of decolonization by constitutional means, which was 
expressly designed to be provisional, and an important antecedent to later post-Cold 
War transitions on which academic literature has tended to focus.1  
 
This symposium issue has analyzed the legal concept of Dominion status 
contextually, placing it within a historically nested set of ideas and practices from the 
Old (Settler) Dominions,2 through the “Bridge Dominion” of Ireland,3 before giving 
detailed attention to the New Dominions of India,4 Pakistan,5 and Ceylon (now Sri 
Lanka).6 This article analyzes the legal configuration of New Dominion 
constitutionalism alongside the political concomitants that gave rise to it, and assesses 
the afterlife of this constitutional model in the above jurisdictions. Although the notion 
of Dominion fell into disuse by 1953, it became reincarnated into the model of 
Commonwealth Realm through which the majority of the remaining British colonies in 
Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean’s acquired independence.7 
 
1 For recent work on post-Communist and post-conflict constitutional transitions, see 
ANDREW ARATO, POST-SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION-MAKING (2016); Constitution-
Making and Political Settlements in Times of Transitions 6(1) GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2017). 
2 Canada (1867), Australia (1901), New Zealand (1907), Newfoundland (1907), South 
Africa (1910). See Peter C. Oliver, “Dominion Status”: History, Framework, and 
Context, 17(4) INT’L J. CONST. L. (2019).  
3 Ireland (1922–1937). See Luke McDonagh, Losing Ireland, Losing the Empire: 
Dominion Status and the Irish Constitutions of 1922 and 1937, 17(4) INT’L J. CONST. 
L. (2019).  
4 India (1947–1950). See Rohit De, Between Midnight and Republic: Theory and 
Practice of India’s Dominion Status, 17(4) INT’L J. CONST. L. (2019). 
5 Pakistan (1947–1956). See Mara Malagodi, Dominion Status and the Origins of 
authoritarian constitutionalism in Pakistan, 17(4) INT’L J. CONST. L. (2019). 
6 Ceylon (1948–1972). See Rehan Abeyratne, Uncertain Sovereignty: Ceylon as a 
Dominion, 1948–1972, 17(4) INT’L J. CONST. L. (2019). 
7 The African Commonwealth Realms were: Ghana (1957–1960); Nigeria (1960–
1963); Sierra Leone (1961–1971); the Gambia (1965–1970); Tanganyika (1961–1962); 
Uganda (1962–1963); Kenya (1963–1964); and Malawi (1964–1966). In the 





Our inquiry into constitutional aspects of decolonization at the twilight of the 
British Empire assesses the successes and failures of New Dominion constitutionalism 
and explores the enduring links between the New Dominion constitutional framework 
and post-independence design and practice in these jurisdictions. While New Dominion 
constitutionalism successfully helped Ireland and the South Asian colonies transition 
expeditiously into independence, it fell short of securing an enduring British influence 
in the newly independent states. The question of success is also linked to the kind of 
legacy that the transitional New Dominion period and its constitutional structures left 
behind. The immediate legacy is institutional and is most clearly reflected in the design 
choices made by the framers of the new republican constitutions crafted to replace the 
Dominion frameworks. The long-term legacy is harder to trace and points to the 
divergent political trajectories of these four postcolonial states. While New Dominion 
constitutionalism arguably succeeded in paving the way to democratization in Ireland 
and India, Pakistan and Ceylon veered toward frequent bouts of authoritarianism and 
often violent sectarian politics.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the significance of the model 
of New Dominion constitutionalism in answering comparative questions about 
constitutional founding moments, constitutional borrowing, and ultimately 
constitutional decay. Section 3 situates the case studies within a wider historical 
context, including not only the end of Empire but also the beginning of the Cold War. 
Section 4 defines New Dominion constitutionalism and isolates ten specific elements 
of this model at the time of adoption of the Dominion constitution. Fourth, it assesses 
the degree of success of New Dominion constitutionalism by focusing on the 
disjuncture between the intended goals of New Dominion constitutionalism from the 
British perspective—retaining a measure of control over newly independent former 
 
Pacific Ocean, respectively, Mauritius (1968–1992) and Fiji (1970–1987) also adopted 
transitional constitutional arrangements. In the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, 1981; 
Bahamas, 1973; Belize, 1981; Dominica, 1978; Grenada, 1974; Jamaica, 1962; Saint 
Christopher and Nevis, 1983; Saint Lucia, 1979; and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
1979) and in the Oceanic islands (Papua New Guinea, 1975; Solomon Islands, 1978; 
and Tuvalu, 1978), the majority of countries remain Commonwealth Realms to this 




colonies—and the aims of local actors, who made use of this transitional model to push 
for full independence from Britain. In each case British hopes were frustrated, while 
local actors made different uses of the constitutional tools offered by Dominion status. 
Finally, it examines the imprint left by the New Dominion constitutional model on 
subsequent constitutional orders, while accepting that this is very difficult to trace. Not 
only does this inquiry involve consideration of counterfactuals, and sometimes 
narratives of denial on the part of the former colonial state, it also raises the question 




2. Si gnificance of New Domini on consti tuti onal ism  
 
New Dominion constitutionalism represents a crucial phase in the history of Ireland, 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—a critical juncture that set each jurisdiction onto a 
particular constitutional trajectory. As such, the adoption and adaptation of Dominion 
status across these case studies help to explain the different constitutional developments 
in these jurisdictions after independence and the long-term legacy of this peculiar set 
of constitutional transitions. 
 
To substantiate the claim that New Dominion constitutionalism represents the 
first transnational constitutional template for securing transitional change on a global 
scale, we first observe that the model offered a technique or platform for transforming 
juridical relations from a condition of subordination to one of equality. This did not 
always necessarily imply full independence—indeed the Balfour Declaration of 1926, 
the canonical statement of Dominion status at an earlier stage of development, carefully 
avoided that term. Old Dominion formulations deliberately left obscure the question of 
what the colony was transitioning to. Ambiguity had always been a feature of the 
politics of Dominion status—Prime Minister Lloyd George told the Commons in 1921 
that it was “difficult and dangerous to give a definition” of Dominion status8—and 
 




could still serve useful transitional functions after 1945.9 New Dominion 
constitutionalism was clearer on the end point—the former colony was en route to full 
independence (not necessarily immediately), albeit with continued external links to 
Britain (or so metropolitan officials hoped). As such, New Dominion constitutional 
instruments were designedly transitional in a way that was not true of their 
predecessors.  
 
The parameters of our case selection can be explained in light of these issues. 
Analysis in this symposium issue concentrates on the South Asian “New” Dominions 
of India (1947–1950), Pakistan (1947–1956), and Ceylon (1948–1972) and their 
immediate antecedent—the “Bridge Dominion” of Ireland (1922–1937). Attention falls 
on non-settler British colonies whose self-government—let alone independence —
London was always reluctant to concede for geostrategic, economic, and cultural 
reasons but was ultimately forced to accept. The mitigation of the sudden loss of key 
imperial possessions was a top priority for post-war Britain.10 The inevitability and 
haste of the transition—alongside Britain’s attempts to retain some form of control —
profoundly shaped the constitutional form of Dominion status across these 
jurisdictions. Contextually, the four case studies acquired self-government in a close 
temporal sequencing and as such they featured intimate political exchanges and 
reciprocal influences in their fight for independence. On the one hand, from a domestic 
perspective, the New Dominions were early but crucial laboratories for the 
constitutional politics of decolonization and democratization given the common, 
transnational constitutional basis upon which they had embarked upon their respective 
journeys as independent nations. On the other hand, from an international perspective, 
the constitutional configuration of the New Dominions’ acquisition of independence 
 
9 Harshan Kumarasingham, The “Tropical Dominions”: The Appeal of Dominion 
Status in the Decolonisation of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, 23 TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 223, 226 (2013): 
“The abstract and nebulous conception of being a Realm and Dominion suited the 
chaotic situation that Britain and its South Asian possessions found themselves in the 
1940s when actions and decisions were needed rapidly.” W. David McIntyre, The 
Strange Death of Dominion Status, 27 J. IMPERIAL & COMMONWEALTH HIST. 193, 
199 (1999): “Dominion status, then, proved a remarkably useful transitional device 
for speeding independence for India and Pakistan, as it had earlier for the ‘old 
Dominions.’” 
10 PHILIP MURPHY, MONARCHY AND THE END OF EMPIRE 34–49 (2013). 
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radically transformed the nature of the Commonwealth and the legal basis for the 
acquisition of membership in the critical early years of the Cold War (1949–1953).11 
 
One consequence was that the former colonial masters were compelled to 
design mutually acceptable but destined-to-be-temporary New Dominion constitutions 
for their former colonies. While written, these documents were—in line with the 
Westminster model—vague and non-entrenched, with a strong executive at the center, 
and few robust checks and balances of a legal nature. They were also engineered with 
a view to retaining a degree of British control and influence over the former colonies 
for as long as possible. As such, New Dominion constitutions were based on the 
evolving precedents of the Old Dominions’ constitutional frameworks and the 
historical demands for self-government that had already underpinned the American 
Revolution. But they were also mediated by the experience of the Irish Free State and 
reflected the key statutory restrictions to the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament 
introduced by the Statute of Westminster in 1931. But the ambiguity surrounding the 
locus of sovereignty within the New Dominion constitutional framework justified the 
preoccupations of many anti-colonial leaders with the notion that Dominionhood was 
a “halfway house” between colonial dependence and full postcolonial independence. 
Ultimately, the choices made by constitutional actors in the Dominion years had long-
term consequences on the processes of state building and constitutional development 
in each of these jurisdictions. 
 
 
3. His torical context of New Domini on consti tutionalism 
 
New Dominion constitutionalism emerges from the ashes of the two world conflicts. 
World War II may not have produced an immediate sea change in Britain’s ambitions 
—it still aspired to be a “hird force” in world affairs—but it certainly left Britain 
materially weakened in financial terms and reduced in its geostrategic capacity. In some 
colonial and former colonial territories, the shared experience of war appeared for a 





Asia and elsewhere had a diminishing effect12 that subsequent British imperial failures 
only served to reinforce.  
 
It was in this wartime and immediately post-war context that the principle of 
self-government was conceded for the colonial Empire (the timing of which usually 
remained unclear).  Subsequent moves in the direction of independence for colonial 
territories, some of which this symposium has tracked, were contained within an 
updated vision of the Anglosphere. As Duncan Bell has observed, almost all 
“midcentury projects regarded the ‘Anglo’ powers as a nucleus or vanguard” of the new 
global order. Although initially a product of the late Victorian period,13 the idea of a 
multinational commonwealth gained ground, eclipsing the Seeleyan vision of a global 
nation state.14 The Balfour Declaration, drafted at the Imperial Conference in 1926, had 
sought to recast the bilateral connection between Britain and the various (Old) 
Dominions as an intimate form of international association based on “free association,” 
though it studiedly avoided the term “independence.”15 “The old club [would] become 
a rules-based association”16 held together through informal ties of sentiment and self-
interest.17 Proponents envisaged the Empire transfigured with the help of new 
technologies into something else, a vast political-economic unit, whether a federation, 
transcontinental state, or multinational commonwealth, that would offer stability and 
leadership to the world.18 Dominionhood represented another instantiation of the idea 
of Greater Britain, one in fact significantly more tangible than most.19  
 
12 Keith Jeffrey, The Second World War, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH 
EMPIRE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 326 (Judith M. Brown & William Roger Louis eds., 
1999). 
13 DUNCAN BELL, ED., VICTORIAN VISIONS OF GLOBAL EMPIRE (2007). 
14 DUNCAN BELL, REORDERING THE WORLD: ESSAYS ON LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE 188 
(2016). 
15 PHILIP MURPHY, MONARCHY AND THE END OF EMPIRE: THE HOUSE OF WINDSOR, THE 
BRITISH GOVERNMMENT, AND THE POSTWAR COMMONWEALTH 17 (2013). 
16 DAVID MCINTYRE, A GUIDE TO THE CONTEMPORARY COMMONWEALTH 69, 77 (2001). 
17 JOHN DARWIN, THE EMPIRE PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH WORLD-
SYSTEM 407 (2011). 
18 DUNCAN BELL, THE IDEA OF GREATER BRITAIN: EMPIRE AND THE FUTURE OF WORLD 
ORDER, 1860-1900 (2007). 
19 Seminal texts include JOHN ROBERT SEELEY, THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND: TWO 
COURSES OF LECTURES (1883); CHARLES DILKE, GREATER BRITAIN (1868); J. A. 
FROUDE, OCEANA, OR ENGLAND AND HER COLONIES (1907); L. T. HOBHOUSE, 




Allowing for some variation across the political spectrum,20 the central aim of 
British imperial policy immediately after 1945 was to move all but the smaller isolated 
colonies into self-government as soon as possible (though that was not expected to be 
all that soon) and, in doing so, to consolidate links with Britain on a permanent basis.21 
Taking Balfour and the Statute of Westminster 1931 into the next generation, New 
Dominion constitutionalism was to act as the “midwife for decolonization.”22 It offered 
a legal platform intended to facilitate a strategic goal: the aim being not to get rid of the 
Empire altogether so much as to reimagine it, the logic being that “if we treat them 
strictly as a[n] [independent] dominion, they will behave very like a loyal colony.”23  
 
The conjunction of imperial nationalism and a Britannic Commonwealth held 
together by bonds of affection was not quite as quixotic as it now appears. The existence 
in the interwar period of self-governing “British” states on three continents outside 
Europe lent a degree of substance to the conceit that the British were a “world people” 
uniquely adapted to the founding of new nations.24 That this was not a straightforward 
case of imperial delusion is supported by the operational effectiveness of this looser 
Britannic version of empire up to 1945, the lion’s share of which25 just about keeping 
together on the strength of old links forged through money, through trade, and in war. 
The subsequent dismantling of so diverse and far-flung an empire was always likely to 
be messy, but whatever the outcome the results would be presented to the public as the 
consequence of British policy. “History would record a commitment to self-
 
20 On the domestic critics of empire, see GREGORY CLAEYS, IMPERIAL SCEPTICS: 
BRITISH CRITICS OF EMPIRE 1850-1920 (2010).  
21 Ronald Hyam, Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in the Colonial Empire, in THE 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 276 (Judith M. 
Brown & William Roger Louis eds., 1999). 
22 TIMOTHY M. SHAW, COMMONWEALTH: INTER- AND NON-STATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 24 (2008). 
23 Memo by Patrick Gordon Walker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, March 1948, quoted in DARWIN, supra note 18, at 
561. 
24 Id. at 392. 
25 Obvious exceptions being South Africa, weakest link among Old Dominions, and 
Ireland, explored in Luke McDonagh, Losing Ireland, Losing the Empire: Dominion 
Status and the Irish Constitutions of 1922 and 1937, 17(4) INT’L J. CONST. L. (2019). . 
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government that had been planned and fulfilled. The British aimed to control their own 
destiny, presiding if possible over the rebirth of the Imperial system rather than its 
dissolution.”26 
 
The Dominion concept, reliant on convention and bilateral negotiation, always 
contained a strong element of plasticity that often proved useful in managing acute 
tensions, a point highlighted in each of our case studies. Nonetheless, somewhere near 
its core the concept reflected a “distinctive blend of national status and Imperial 
identity” and rested on a belief strongly held in the metropolis that in colonial societies 
without a common culture, adherence to British institutions and ideas was the most 
plausible foundation for nation building.27 The idea seemed to be that a loose but not 
content-less constitutional form lent itself to the inculcation of a particular culture or 
style of constitutional politics, which in turn lent itself to the maintenance of close 
material, cultural, and political ties with the former colonial power.  
 
Our four jurisdiction-specific studies—Ireland, India, Pakistan, Ceylon—show 
how far from reality such hopes lay. The practical instantiation of the New Dominion 
model varied considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, yet the case studies reveal 
a consistent story of the loss of imperial control. We must acknowledge here the 
significance both of race and of “national liberation” movements in each territory. In 
its earlier iteration, Dominion status had been reserved for the “white” settler 
colonies—Ireland remained something of a case apart28—and as such fitted neatly with 
generally held assumptions about European civilizational superiority.29 The more 
densely plural nature of post-1945 arrangements made New Dominion 
 
26 William Roger Louis, The Dissolution of the British Empire, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 329 (Judith M. Brown & 
William Roger Louis eds., 1999). 
27 John Darwin, A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics, in 
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85 (Judith 
M. Brown & William Roger Louis eds., 1999). 
28 Donal Lowry distinguishes Ireland by calling it the “Captive Dominion”: The Captive 
Dominion: Imperial Realities behind Irish Diplomacy, 1922-49, 36 IRISH HIST. STUD. 
202 (2008). 
29 These assumptions were held by liberals as well as conservatives. See, e.g., KARUNA 
MANTENA, ALIBIS OF EMPIRE: HENRY MAINE AND THE ENDS OF LIBERAL IMPERIALISM 




constitutionalism more complicated in race terms. In fact, some soon-to-be-former 
colonies had reservations about the racial assumptions bound up with Dominionhood, 
and some rejected it partly on that basis, while others saw it as the clearest path to 
independence.30  
 
The Old Dominion model was initially framed with an expectation that though 
(internal) legal sovereignty was being transferred, the settler Dominions would remain 
British (or at least Britannic) not just culturally and socially but also in terms of trade, 
commerce, and military cooperation. It was taken for granted that the white or settler 
colonies would adapt over time to the Westminster-derived constitutional model. The 
opposite supposition tended to be made about the prospect of self-rule in territories such 
as India and Ceylon—and also Ireland, whose example acts as a point of disruption 
within the Dominion narrative. True, the Dominion model had been successfully 
applied there, even though it was only accepted in 1922 as a compromise; the ambiguity 
of the Old Dominion model once more proving its worth in squaring the circle between 
the aims and objectives of the British government and Irish nationalists. Yet the very 
success of Irish self-rule after 1922 also tended to disprove previously held assumptions 
about the unsuitability of the Irish for self-government. The Dominion experience in 
Ireland acted as an aversive as well as aspirational example,31 and showed how it was 
possible to treat the Dominion constitution in a rough and ready way to secure a 
nationalist agenda determined by local elites. From the British perspective, although 
Ireland was an imperfect case, the bridge now existed to transform the Old Dominion 
model into the new one. 
 
 
4. Fundamental elements  of New Dominion consti tuti onal ism 
 
 
30 Burma was given the choice of whether or not to stay within the British 
Commonwealth system but decided in 1947 to break the tie with Britain, becoming a 
sovereign and independent republic in January 1948. The Sudanese and Egyptians were 
also among those who believed that the phrase “Dominion status” implied further 
British domination. Louis, supra note 27, at 337–338, 341. 
31 Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for 
Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1(2) INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 296 (2003). 
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Both transitional and transnational, New Dominion status offered an interim frame of 
government for political transitions, the fuzzy center of which derived from 
Westminster-style conventions of political constitutionalism, as well as a template 
establishing the legal basis for constituting the fully independent state. New Dominion 
constitutions facilitated the execution of government functions through structures 
developed across the boundaries of distinct political units: the United Kingdom on one 
hand, and the Dominions on the other. These legal structures are not easy to disentangle 
from a normative perspective, as they contain elements of both imperial and 
postcolonial institutions and principles.32 
 
At a basic level,  however, New Dominion constitutionalism represents a 
modality of decolonization by constitutional means. Though distinctive, the model 
remains consonant with the deep structure of British constitutionalism. True, the 
model’s emphasis on explicit and detailed constitutional design at first sight seems 
rather alien to that tradition. But we should remember that by the mid-twentieth century 
British jurists, officials, and statesmen had accrued decades of experience in writing 
constitutional texts outside the metropolitan sphere. “A year never passes without 
several Constitutions or constitutional amendments being produced, mostly by the 
Colonial Office,” Ivor Jennings and C. M. Young wrote in 1938. “It may indeed be said 
that while the British choose to live under an ‘unwritten’ Constitution, they are by far 
the most prolific makers of written Constitutions —for others.”33  
 
In this vein, British jurists and officials of the period generally formed the view 
that the British system of government not only provided a superior model but also this 
model could be exported to former colonies to help develop self-governing institutions 
and the normative environment needed to sustain them.34 This differs from earlier 
juristic attitudes. In Victorian England, appreciation of the British constitutional 
Sonderweg often produced the opposite conclusion on the viability of transnational 
constitutional transplants. A. V. Dicey, for instance, writing under the influence of 
 
32 CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 2 (2016). 
33 W. IVOR JENNINGS & C. M. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
25 (1938). 
34 See, e.g., W. IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1–24 (1958).  
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Maine,35 opined at the turn of the century that it was “in the highest degree doubtful 
how far English institutions can with success be transplanted to countries of which the 
development has been utterly different from the exceptional history of England.”36 
 
As a result, features of New Dominion constitutionalism replicate essential 
elements of traditional British constitutional praxis. The model is predicated on the idea 
of gradual and managed change, allied to a thoroughgoing pragmatism at the level of 
both conception and execution,37 and seeks to normalize exceptional situations through 
the deployment of legal techniques.38  
 
Commentators tend to focus on the pragmatic and flexible nature of the New 
Dominion constitutional framework. Our case studies indeed reveal considerable 
variety across territories—even within the same region—in the way the Dominion 
constitutional framework was adapted to suit local circumstances. And it is impossible 
to understand the constitutional politics of Dominion status without acknowledging the 
significance of gaps and ambiguities in the relevant documents and legal 
arrangements.39 But it remains the case that the New Dominion model can be 
characterized as a “constitutional matrix” with a baseline common to all the 
jurisdictions in which it was deployed. As such, it both favored and encouraged the 
development of certain forms of institutional politics. As an expression or derivation of 
British constitutional principles, we can identify ten core elements of the New 
Dominion model that together represent a “snapshot” of that constitutional form at the 
time Dominion status was granted and accepted. The first three relate to government 
structures, the next four go to the Dominion’s relationship with Britain, while the last 
three capture more specifically transitional features.  
 
1. Responsible government :  
 
35 Dylan Lino, Alfred Venn Dicey and the Constitutional Theory of Empire, 36 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 751, 764–765 (2016).  
36 A. V. Dicey, Will the Form of Parliamentary Government Be Permanent? 13 HARV. 
L. REV. 67, 71 (1899(.  
37 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY ch. 4(1992).  
38 THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE: LAW, PREROGATIVE AND EMPIRE (2015).  
39 For analysis of vagueness as a general feature (and virtue) of constitutions, see 
Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in VAGUENESS IN NORMATIVE 
TEXTS (Vijay K. Bhatia, Jan Engberg, Maurizio Gotti, & Dorothee Heller eds., 2005). 
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The New Dominion constitutional framework was centered on a directly or 
indirectly elected Parliament,40 thus substantiating the meaning of independence 
in institutional terms under the Dominion constitution. The belief in the validity 
and effectiveness of a Westminster-derived majoritarian parliamentary form of 
government was such that alternative proposals, such as an element of 
consociationalism in Ceylon that may have secured minority interests, were 
roundly rejected. In Ireland and Pakistan, the Dominion Parliament’s dual role 
as legislator and Constituent Assembly proved problematic. The flexible nature 
of Westminster-derived New Dominion constitutionalism, which emphasized 
political rather than legal controls, often failed to hold the executive to account 
during the transitional period. Parliamentarism could readily amount in this 
context to elective dictatorship (e.g. Pakistan).  
 
2. Strong central executive:  
New Dominion constitutions created a strong executive at the center, featuring 
extensive prime ministerial (prerogative) powers but having its chief institutional 
expression in Cabinet government. Indeed, part of the reason local leaders (e.g. in 
India) instrumentally accepted Dominion status was because of the 
transformative potential inherent in a flexible constitutional framework in which 
power was streamlined and centralized. We have seen this potential utilized in all 
four jurisdiction-specific case studies to consolidate power at the center and 
advance a centripetal state-building process led by political elites. 
 
 
3. Independent, but deferential judiciary:  
New Dominion constitutions emphasized the centrality of the rule of law, initially 
based on a British or Diceyean model, guarded by an independent judiciary and 
given shape through a non-entrenched constitution almost entirely devoid of 
 
40 The British constitutional tradition was more comfortable with unitary states than 
with federal structures. Dicey thought that the constitutional rigidity typically 
necessitated by federalism was ill-suited to the demands of imperial rule. For him, 




justiciable fundamental rights.41 Although the New Dominion courts quickly 
developed powers of judicial review of executive action,  42 the immediate bequest 
of British constitutionalism tended to be courts that deferred to the political 
branches of state on constitutional matters (e.g. The State (Ryan) v. Lennon43 in 
Ireland, the Tamizuddin litigation44 in Pakistan, and cases on illiberal legislation 
in Ceylon in 1948, 1949, and 1956). Constitutional litigation during the 
Dominion period revealed the existing gulf between substantive and procedural 
understandings of the rule of law across the various jurisdictions.45 
 
4. Legal basis:  
It is perhaps notable that the legal basis of all New Dominion constitutions rested 
on an Act of the Imperial Parliament. Although different routes were adopted, all 
the New Dominion legal structures remained sufficiently open to accommodate 
the agency of local political actors in the transition. A lesson was learned from 
the Bridge Dominion—the Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922 included as a 
schedule the document drafted by the Third Dáil to serve as Ireland’s Dominion 
constitution. Later, the India Independence Act 1947 amended the Government of 
India Act 1935 so that it could serve as India and Pakistan’s Dominion 
constitutions and gave statutory basis to their respective Constituent Assemblies; 
and the Ceylon Independence Act 1947 allowed the Colonial Office to prepare by 
Order in Council the Dominion constitution of Sri Lanka. 
 
41 The idea of a judicially enforceable bill of rights was alien to the Diceyan spirit of 
British constitutionalism, and thus not a feature of New Dominion constitutions. But 
some British-led constitutional efforts had earlier included the incorporation of specific 
rights: e.g. the Government of India Act 1935 guaranteed property rights and protected 
against discrimination based on religion, place of birth, or color for the purposes of 
public sector employment, property rights, and access to a profession (sections 298 and 
462). 
42 India’s trend-setting role in this regard, and in respect to developing a bill of rights, 
is acknowledged in CHARLES O. H. PARKINSON, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND 
DECOLONIZATION 46 (2007). 
43 [1935] 1 I.R. 170. 
44 At first instance, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan v. Federation of Pakistan, (1955) PLD 
1955 (Sindh) 96; on appeal Federation of Pakistan and Others v. Maulvi Tamizuddin 
Khan, (1955) PLD (Federal Court) 240. 
45 An interesting point of contrast might be the development of rights jurisprudence and 
the principle of proportionality in post-War (West) Germany. See, e.g., JACCO 
BOMHOFF, BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE ORIGINS AND MEANING OF 




5. Severing of the legislative link:  
The basic text here was the Statute of Westminster 1931, passed after the 
imperial conferences of 1926–1930 to stabilize legal relations between various 
units of the Empire, and then reiterated in the various Independence Acts. From 
the metropolitan perspective, the Statute’s self-limiting properties gave rise to a 
constitutional conundrum concerning the absolute nature of parliamentary 
sovereignty.46 But from a more cosmopolitan angle, the self-limiting of the 
Imperial Parliament was a pragmatic tool that operated to allow the self-
governing polity to amend the Dominion constitution and draft the new 
permanent constitution on whatever terms it pleased.  
 
6. Retention of the executive link:  
The retention of an associational link to the Crown is a connection given 
expression in the office of the Governor General as Head of State appointed by 
the British monarch.47 A relic of the UK’s monarchical tradition, the governor-
general was expected to perform symbolic and ceremonial functions within the 
self-governing polity but often played an active role in constitutional politics, 
eluding the weak accountability mechanisms of Dominion constitutionalism.48 
For instance, the governor-general of Pakistan (allied with the developing 
bureaucratic-military axis) used his prerogative powers to dissolve that country’s 
first Constituent Assembly, whereas in India Lord Mountbatten, as governor-
general, acquiesced in the government’s decision to retain draconian laws that 
 
46 See British Coal Corporation v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500, 520–522, discussed in  
Peter C. Oliver, “Dominion Status”: History, Framework, and Context, 17(4) INT’L J. 
CONST. L. (2019). For more on that conundrum, see another seminal Privy Council 
case arising from a decolonizing context of a slightly later vintage: Madzimbamuto v. 
Lardner-Burke, [1969] A.C. 645. 
47 For analysis of what became an incredibly complex area of jurisprudence, see Anne 
Twomey, Responsible Government and the Divisibility of the Crown, (PUB. L. 742 
(2008). The question continues to bedevil UK courts. See R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v. 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2005] U.K.H.L. 57; R 
(Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2), [2008] 
U.K.H.L. 61; Keyu v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
[2015] U.K.S.C. 69.  
48 Anne Twomey, Discretionary Reserve Powers of Heads of State, in CONSTITUTION-
MAKING IN ASIA 55 (Harshan Kumarasingham ed., 2016). 
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enabled the quashing of dissent. The semblance of an ongoing linkage between 
the national government and the British Crown also proved useful in India in a 
different way, facilitating the assimilation of the princely states within the new 
state structure. From the British perspective, the link to the Crown was 
instrumental in retaining the Dominions within the Commonwealth and within 
the British sphere of influence. 
 
7. Retention of the judicial link:  
The retention of the Joint Committee of the Privy Council, the old imperial court, 
as the highest court of appeal when Dominion status was granted, was deemed 
essential by the British but considered highly problematic by independence 
leaders. This jurisdiction was brought to an end within a few years of 
independence in Ireland, India, and Pakistan, though it was retained in Ceylon 
until the new republican constitution (of Sri Lanka) was adopted in 1972. But 
even in jurisdictions that severed the link with the Privy Council, forms of 
transnational constitutional dialogue endured as local courts found themselves 
interpreting the Dominion constitution in light of both the common law and post-
independence legal developments. 
 
 
8. Lack of roadmap for constitutional transition:  
New Dominion constitutions, notwithstanding the fact that they were conceived 
as transitional, all featured a vague or non-existent legal framework for drafting 
the permanent constitution. As a platform for transitional constitutionalism, the 
New Dominion model is thus noteworthy for its lack of specific transitional 
arrangements for constitution making. Or, rather, the arrangements it made 
tended to be institutional or structural rather than legal or substantive. The 
absence of a blueprint for constitution making may have facilitated national 
ownership of the independent constitution as the various drafting processes could 
be seen as autochthonous even if they involved input from non-nationals. By the 
same token, however, being essentially bargains between the British and local 
leaders, Dominion constitutions were virtually silent on the balance of power 
among local elites that the new constitution might reflect. We can see this 
vagueness as the external manifestation of a style of (political) constitutionalism 
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that dominated the British constitutional thought of the period. Otherwise 
divergent writers like Dicey and Jennings could agree that constitutions were 
ideally flexible and political,  with most matters left open for parties operating in a 
robust institutional context and within a matrix of sufficiently agreed upon 
conventions to resolve. Exported to New Dominion settings, the flexible and 
political became ambiguous and diplomatic, a situation which the absence of 
either well-grounded institutions or sufficiently agreed upon conventions made 
ripe for exploitation.  
 
9. Constitutional ambiguity and versatility:  
An emphasis on evolution and managed change, admittedly more implicit to New 
Dominion constitutions than textual, gave enormous leeway to local political 
leaders. The enduring belief in the value of open-textured constitutions and the 
virtue of ambiguity seems to be have been predicated on the notion that elites, 
both local and British, could work together to secure a harmony of interests 
between metropolitan interests and those of the self-governing polity. So 
understood, New Dominion constitutionalism becomes an elaboration of an 
essentially eighteenth-century constitutional philosophy. According to Burke’s 
canonical statement, constitutions were fundamentally moral orders that served 
ideally to iron out discontinuities between past and present and to find an 
overarching balance capable of transcending potential conflict between social 
orders. Dominion status was thus a “constitutional laboratory” that remained 
peculiarly open to the contextual specificities of the various jurisdictions, a 
feature of the model that helps to explain the diverse trajectories identified in our 
case studies. It should not be forgotten that the experiences that took place under 
the New Dominion umbrella occurred in deeply divided polities and might 
usefully be understood as instances of what Hanna Lerner calls the incrementalist 
approach to constitution making.49 
 
10. Acquisition of external sovereignty:  
We tend to think about the decolonization process from the legal angle in terms 
of the movement from subjection to sovereignty. While this is the most important 
 
49 HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2011).  
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and obvious consequence of decolonization it is not the only one. Decolonization 
can also be conceived in terms of a reconfiguration of patterns of international 
association. Previous terms of association were structured by the imperial power. 
The nature of those terms varied depending on the period, but certainly within the 
old Empire conduct and responsibility of foreign policy lay exclusively with the 
British government.50 Even later,  supposedly “free” association revolved around 
a series of (lopsided) pacts within the intra-imperial network of territories.51 
Accrual of New Dominion status entailed a new international standing, entitling 
the former colony to membership of a different club. Recognized as a full 
international legal agent,52 the newly independent state was now in principle free 
to exercise its capacities as a responsible member of the international legal 
community.  
 
5. Achievements  and dr awbacks of New Domini on consti tuti onal ism 
 
So was New Dominion constitutionalism a failure? The variety of the national 
independence trajectories in our four case studies makes it hard to draw general 
conclusions, and “success” in this context is difficult to define with any precision.53 At 
least in an attenuated and technical sense, all our case studies are stories of success’ 
since the Dominion model was adopted in these jurisdictions, albeit sometimes only for 
a short interval. In other parts of the Colonial Empire, Dominion status was rejected 
outright. The most notable contemporary example is Burma, which became a republic 
 
50 For an intriguing contemporary analysis of the complex transitional arrangements in 
the interwar or “Old” Dominion era, see William Harrison Moore, The British Empire 
in Foreign Policy, 5 AUSTRALIAN Q. 3 (1933). 
51 For analysis of the challenges in defining this wider association See, e.g., R. Bright 
& A. Dilley, After the British World, 60 THE HISTORICAL JOURNAL 547-568 
(2017). 
52 India had exercised some legal capacity in the international sphere before 
independence. It was a founder member of the United Nations, joining in October 1945, 
as it had been of the League of Nations. It had earlier had semi-independent status in 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, headed by the Secretary of State for India, Edwin 
Montagu, and two Indian members, Lord Sinha and the Maharjah of Bikaner: 
MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS 56 (2001). 
53 Although up until the mid-1960s, the Foreign Office kept a balance sheet of post-
independence success and failures at least in east Africa. A. M. Palliser, Policy towards 




in 1948 without passing through the Dominion stage and promptly left the 
Commonwealth. During the 1950s and 1960s other former colonies, such as Sudan, 
took a similar path, something we reflect upon later when considering the legacy of 
New Dominion constitutionalism.  
 
More substantively, we might note that while the transition from colonial 
territory to autonomous Dominion to fully sovereign state was not always achieved 
without violence, most obviously so in respect of the partition of India, the New 
Dominion model had some success in ushering various participants relatively 
peacefully along the path to independence.54 But even if we are inclined to accept this 
claim, the case studies also suggest that the price paid for peace was the ceding by the 
British of any residual authority to local elites much faster than they intended or had 
predicted. This central theme—of British failure, or at least the way things slipped very 
quickly from British control—emerges strongly from the case studies. Moreover, the 
substantial widening of the club of self-governing Dominions beyond the “Old” 
Dominion model largely emptied the category of substance while also threatening the 
associational potential of the New Commonwealth order. Subsequent proliferation of 
Dominions, Commonwealth Realms, and independent Republics meant not only the 
dissolution of the British Empire but also the final demise of old dreams of global order 
centered on British domination, a point reinforced by the Suez debacle of 1956. 
 
But we need to add another piece to our evaluative picture: in the period that we 
are considering the dismembering of the British Empire became inextricably 
intertwined with the Cold War.55 As the Cold War heated up in Asia with the success 
of the Communist Revolution in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 
 
54 The late-imperial wars, conflicts, and breaches of the peace have tended to be rather 
marginalized. Interestingly, recent court cases have raised questions of the 
mistreatment of subject peoples from this era in both Malaya/Malaysia and Kenya. See 
Keyu v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2015] U.K.S.C. 
69, discussed in Thomas Poole & Sangeeta Shah, A Very Successful Action? Keyu and 
Historical Wrongs at Common Law, 7 UK SUPREME COURT Y.B. 167 (2016); Ndiku 
Mutua and Others v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [2011] E.W.H.C. 1913 
(QB) and [2012] E.W.H.C. 2678 (QB), discussed in Devika Hovell, The Gulf Between 
Tortious and Torturous: UK Responsibility for Mistreatment of the Mau Mau in 
Colonial Kenya, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 223 (2013).  
55 Leslie James & Elisabeth Leake, Introduction, in DECOLONIZATION AND THE COLD 
WAR: NEGOTIATING INDEPENDENCE 2 (Leslie James & Elisabeth Leake eds., 2015). 
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1950, South Asia acquired crucial importance. It became a strategic imperative to retain 
the newly independent states of the Indian subcontinent within the US-dominated, 
Western sphere of influence. The British aimed to further Western interests in the 
region by influencing the constitution-making processes, and even constitutional 
litigation, in the decolonizing states—witness British jurist Sir Ivor Jennings’s work as 
a constitutional consultant not only in Sri Lanka and Pakistan but also Malaya, the 
Maldives, and Nepal at key transitional moments.56  
 
Our case studies indicate that the New Dominion model had mixed success in 
achieving this goal. Shortly after independence, India turned towards the Soviet Union 
and co-founded the Non-Aligned Movement, whereas in 1954 Pakistan became the 
foremost Western ally in the region as a member of SEATO (the Asian equivalent of 
NATO). As such, Britain’s attempts to ‘lock in’ influence while ceding control through 
the New Dominion constitutional framework were to a great extent unsuccessful.  
 
 
6. Conclus ion: Legacie s of New Domini on consti tuti onal ism 
 
From the perspective of the New Dominions, the legacy of this transitional 
constitutional framework remains evident in post-independence constitutional design 
and practice across the case studies and helps explain the different constitutional 
trajectories of these countries after independence. Moreover, while Dominion status in 
Ireland, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka represented an important stage in the 
constitutional development of these nations, the historical elision of the New Dominion 
period in the national consciousness is all the more significant. In some of these 
jurisdictions, this seems to reflect a deliberate, almost official, policy of minimizing—
even forgetting—that a transitional phase had ever occurred. If we understand New 
Dominion framework as an instrument of state-building for the various decolonizing 
 
56 M. Malagodi, Ivor Jennings’ Constitutional Legacy Beyond the Occidental-Oriental 
Divide, 42 J. L. & SOC’Y 102 (2015); J. M. Fernando, Constitutionalism and the Politics 
of Constitution-Making in Malaya, 1956-1957, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA 137 
(Harshan Kumarasingham ed., 2016); Mara Malagodi, Constitution Drafting as Cold 
War Realpolitik: Sir Ivor Jennings and Nepal’s 1959 Constitution, in CONSTITUTION-
MAKING IN ASIA 154 (Harshan Kumarasingham ed., 2016). See also IVOR JENNINGS, 




nations, the forgettable quality of the constitutional order that it instantiated may be 
seen as a useful, perhaps even virtuous, quality of this mode of transitional 
constitutionalism. This semi-deliberate strategy of “forgetting” may be seen as an 
important way in which each country sought to overcome the “sovereignty deficit” at 
the heart of the New Dominion constitution-making process, a consequence of their 
origins as legal texts crafted largely by the imperial center whose formal authority 
derived from an Act of the Imperial Parliament. While Ireland sought to escape the 
neocolonial nature of Dominion status by avoiding the imposition of a constitutional 
settlement by the imperial center by drafting the constitution by itself and having it 
rubber-stamped by an Act of the Imperial Parliament, even this did not suffice and a 
new document was enacted in 1937; meanwhile, the South Asian Dominions faced a 
greater legitimacy deficit with regard to their constitutional transition to independence.  
 
The incrementalist features of New Dominion constitutions had other 
ramifications, not all of them so sanguine. Most notably, the open-textured nature of 
those constitutions and the many silences they contained made it easier for local elites 
to determine the institutional and normative structures of the new state. Non-
prescriptive New Dominion constitutional arrangements may have facilitated the 
genesis of new independent constitutions. But they could also be exploited by local 
leaders in order to consolidate their position and sideline political rivals. It may not be 
a coincidence that the subsequent republican constitutions of the jurisdictions studied 
in this special issue featured dominant executives, and that Pakistan and Sri Lanka both 
saw recurring bouts of authoritarian rule. 
 
The length of the transition out of Dominion status also had a bearing on post-
independence constitutional development. The case studies indicate that short 
transitional periods may have helped to conflate the somehow “post-sovereign” 
constitutional birth of the nation with full independence.57 India, for example, moved 
quickly to instantiate a Constituent Assembly, that quintessential expression of 
sovereign constituent capacity. In Ireland, the dangers associated with a lengthy 
transition may have been mitigated by the ability of the Third Dáil to lead the 
constitution-making process and harness its long-term legitimacy. But in Pakistan and 
 
57 ARATO, supra note 1. 
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Sri Lanka, the potential energy associated with the “constitutional moment” of 
independence gradually dissipated, resulting in successive bouts of authoritarian 
constitutionalism.58 
 
There is an argument to be made that the central institutional legacy of New 
Dominion constitutions was aversive in another, and broader, sense. More specifically, 
the legal side of the permanent constitutions adopted in most of the jurisdictions in our 
study owed relatively little to the Westminster template that provided if not the detail 
then certainly the normative mood music of the New Dominion constitutional style. 
Ireland, India, and Pakistan were to adopt entrenched constitutions featuring extensive 
and justiciable fundamental rights, a substantial departure from the New Dominion 
template. What has been said in respect of the Indian practice with regard to rights—
that it “owed little to British influence, drawing instead on the bills of rights in the 
American, French and Irish constitutions”59—would also seem to apply to these other 
nations. Granville Austin explains the central importance of the judiciary in the framing 
of India’s independent constitution: 
 
The members of the Constituent Assembly brought to the framing of the Judicial 
provisions of the Constitution an idealism equaled only by that shown towards the 
Fundamental Rights. Indeed, the Judiciary was seen as an extension of the Rights, 
for it was the courts that would give the rights force. . . . The courts were also 
idealized because, as guardians of the Constitution, they would be the expression 
of the new law created by Indians for Indians. During the British period, despite 
the presence of Indians in government, Indians had not been responsible for the 
laws that governed them. Indians had neither law nor courts of their own, and both 
the courts and the law had been designed to meet the needs of the colonial power. 
Under the Constitution, all this would be changed. The courts were, therefore, 
widely considered one of the most tangible evidences of independence.60 
 
58 MARK TUSHNET & MADHAV KHOSLA (EDS.), UNSTABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM. LAW 
AND POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA (2015). 
59 C. Parkinson, British Constitutional Thought and the Emergence of Bills of Rights in 
Britain’s Overseas Territories in Asia at Decolonisation, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN 
ASIA 41 (Harshan Kumarasingham ed., 2016).  




Pakistan sought to emulate the Indian model and to enshrine legal checks on 
executive power in the first 1956 republican constitution, but the military coup of 1958 
soon brought that constitutional experiment to an end. Sri Lanka stayed truer to the 
(old) Westminster tradition of non-justiciable rights and limited judicial review. But 
this remains one of the most contentious features of its constitutional arrangements and 
a source of demands for structural reform. In this respect, it remains difficult to assess 
the link between New Dominion constitutionalism and the political trajectories of the 
four case studies after independence, especially with regard to democratization.  
 
Finally, the experience of New Dominion constitutionalism helped shape the 
modality of decolonization of the remaining colonies and dependencies of the British 
Empire. In retrospect, the year 1949 represents a watershed: within ten days in April 
Ireland became a Republic and left the Commonwealth, while India remained in the 
Commonwealth as a Republic. These changes equated with a new supranational role 
for the Crown and in the associational basis of the Commonwealth. As a result, the 
1949 Conference produced what is known as the London Declaration: “the King is the 
symbol of the free association of its independent members and as such the Head of the 
Commonwealth,”61 a formulation which found legal expression in the Royal Titles Act 
1953. In order to cement that new statutorily enshrined relationship of equality among 
Commonwealth members, it was felt that the term “Dominion” ought to be discarded. 
Gordon Walker, MP, expressed this widely held sentiment when he said in the 
parliamentary debate on the Act in 1953:  
I welcome the disappearance of the words “Dominions beyond the seas”, which, I 
hope will mark the formal disappearance of the word “Dominions” from the 
vocabulary of the Commonwealth. This word is disliked in many parts of the 
Commonwealth because it suggests a distinction of status between the United 
Kingdom and other parts of the Commonwealth. The words “other Realms” in the 
title will give the word “realm” a greater currency than it has today, and it is a more 
 
61 McIntyre, supra note 9, at 202. 
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acceptable word.62  
 
The expression “Commonwealth Realm” came to substitute for the term “Dominion,” 
and technically both Pakistan and Ceylon became Commonwealth Realms in 1953 
before they became Republics in 1956 and 1972, respectively. But the substance of the 
transitional constitutional arrangements created under New Dominion status remained 
largely unchanged—the majority of British colonies from the 1950s onward continued 
to acquire independence by constitutional means that were in most respects the same as 
those deployed earlier on in the South Asian Dominions.63 Former British colonies in 
this period obtained “fully responsible status within the Commonwealth” on the basis 
of Independence Acts passed by Westminster adhering to a pattern of constitutional 
arrangements that, although they might now fall under the rubric of Commonwealth 
Realm, clearly derived from New Dominion constitutionalism.64 In fact, after 1949, as 
the term “Dominion” fell into disuse, the majority of British former colonies and 
dependencies still adopted transitional constitutional frameworks similar to the New 
Dominion constitutional model. 
 
On this point, it is interesting that only a small number of decolonizing nations 
regarded the option of a transitional constitutional deal as an unsuitable or unnecessary 
accompaniment on the path to independence. Malaya became independent in 1957, for 
instance, but remained a Commonwealth member as an “independent sovereign country 
within the Commonwealth” under the Federation of Malaya Independence Act 1957. 
Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia) and the Bechuanaland Protectorate (later Botswana) 
followed the same pattern and became republics in 1964 and 1966, respectively, while 
 
62 Hansard HC Deb 03 March 1953 Vol. 512 cc193-257. Walker, son of a Scottish judge 
in the Indian Civil Service, had served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and then as Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations in the Labour government of 1945–1951. He was later to serve as Foreign 
Secretary under Harold Wilson.   
63 Supra note 7.  
64 An analysis of “Commonwealth Realm” constitutionalism as a transitional and 
transnational constitutional mold to facilitate decolonization after New Dominion 
constitutionalism fell into disuse is beyond the scope of this article, but it remains an 
area of constitutional history worth exploring in a comparative fashion. 
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still retaining Commonwealth membership.  
 
Yet, while there is a great deal of legal continuity between the New Dominion 
model and the later Commonwealth Realms, by the 1960s it became clear that the 
Commonwealth was not what the British had intended it to be after World War II. For 
the British, the New Dominion transitional model had represented a global attempt to 
combine the earlier idea of imperial nationalism with a new vision of a strong, Britannic 
Commonwealth held together by bonds of affection. It did not take long for this 
Britannic Commonwealth dream to be revealed as little more than an imperial fantasy. 
The reality of the Commonwealth of Nations became that of a diverse, loose, and 
largely symbolic association of independent states. The case studies in this symposium 
demonstrate why the New Dominion model did not achieve what British politicians and 
jurists had intended: the British aim of retaining a measure of control over newly 
independent former colonies could not be reconciled with the goals of local actors, to 
whom sovereignty had undisputedly passed, and who made use of the transitional New 
Dominion model to enshrine new state institutions and structures, and to push for full 
independence from Britain.  
